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Abstract
This paper describes the Thermal Advanced Automation
Project (TAAP) approach and architecture for automating
the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Active Thermal Control
System (ATCS). The baseline functionafity and advanced
automation techniques for Fault Detection, Isolation, and
Recovery (FDIR) will be compared and contrasted. Advanced
automation techniques such as rule-based systems and
model-based reasoning should be utilized to efficiently
control, monitor, and diagnose this extremely complex
physical system. TAAP is developing advanced FDIR software
for use on the SSF thermal control system. The goal of TAAP
is to join Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) technology, using
a combination of rules and model-based reasoning, with
conventional monitoring and control software in order to
maximize autonomy of the ATCS. TAAP's predecessor was
NASA's Thermal Expert System (TEXSYS) project which was
the first large real-time expert system to use both extensive
rules and model-based reasoning to control and perform
FDIR on a large, complex physical system. TEXSYS showed
that a method is needed for safely and inexpensively testing
all possible faults of the A TCS, particularly those potentially
damaging to the hardware, in order to develop a fully capable
FDIR system. TAAP therefore includes the development of a
high-fidefity simulation of the thermal control system. The
simulation provides realistic, dynamic ATCS behavior and
fault insertion capability for software testing without
hardware related risks or expense. In addition, thermal
engineers will gain greater confidence in the KBS FDIR
software than was possible prior to this kind of simulation
testing. The TAAP KBS will initially be a ground-based
extension of the baseline A TCS monitoring and control
software and could be migrated on-board as additional
computational resources are made available.
Introduction
Thermal control systems are very complicated to operate in
both nominal and off-nominal states. This problem is
compounded in space. The Space Station Freedom (SSF)
Thermal Test Bed (TTB) al the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC)
in Houston, Texas is one such complex system. The operation
takes several thermal experts (typically thermal engineers)
as well as a staff of technicians, safety officials and other
support personnel. In short, the TTB is expensive to operate
and technically complex, particularly in off-nominal states.
For this reason and due tO the lack of plausibility of having
such a TTB support staff on the space station, the need for
autonomous operation of the Space Station Freedom Project's
(SSFP) Thermal Control System (TCS) is apparent.
However complicated the task of autonomous monitoring and
control of the SSFP TCS, it is necessary to have a high degree
of automation due to the harsh environment of space and the
time which astronauts would spend on such "housekeeping"
functions (e.g. monitoring temperatures, opening valves,
etc...) without such system autonomy.
It is this problem that NASA began addressing in the System's
Autonomy Demonstration Program's (SADP) Thermal Expert
System (TEXSYS) project. The TEXSYS project was
developed in the middle to late 1980's and was demonstrated
In August of 1989. The project's major accomplishment was
lhat it was the first real-time expert system to
autonomously operate and diagnose faults in a system as
complex as the thermal testbed TCS.
TEXSYS consisted of several software/hardware modules
which enabled the expert syslem to accomplish its task.
Figure f shows the architecture of the TEXSYS project. The
overall job of TEXSYS was accomplished via the use of 4
separate computers. The expert system was on a Symbolics
3650 (denoted TEXSYS SYMBOLICS) and was the "brains" of
operating the TTB.
The TEXSYS software diagnosed 17 faults and operated the
thermal testbed ATCS accomplishing system startup,
shutdown and temperature set-point change. The expert
system utilized model-based reasoning with qualitative
modeling and hypothetical reasoning via" an assumption-
based truth mainlenance system [Glass 90]. Rules were
used in conjunction with the models to accomplish diagnosis
of most of the faults successfully isolated..The expert system
was relatively large in terms of memory usage (on the order
of several megabytes of memory).
The TEXSYS prototype diagnosed faults and controlled the
behavior of a GROUND-based system in the TTB. It is
desirable to utilize this technology in a space-based system
located on the Space Station itself. The constraints of
ire,sources (memory and power) on the Space Station will not
'allow for such a large software system to be implemented. In
•addition, a high cost was incurred due to the use of such a
•complex hardware system for debugging and testing. The
:notion of using a simulation of the ATCS was not fully
explored in TEXSYS.
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These reasons along with the necessity of utilizing the possible. The KBS itself is d_veloped in a C-based language
technology of TEXSYS for SSFP ATCS operation made follow- called CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System).
on work to TEXSYS important if not inevitable. NASA CLIPS has been ported to provide to an Ada-based version.
Headquarters' Advanced Development for SSFP initiated the The simulation and KBS portions will be connected via a
Thermal Advanced Automation Project (TAAP) to address Space Station-like database system. This system is also.
these problems, developed in Ada.
The goals of TAAP include the development of a knowledge-
based system (KBS) to cover all known faults on the Thermal
Control System, a greater number of faults than TEXSYS
covered. Also, to detect inconsistent behavior which cannot
be attributed to a known fault. A high-fidelity simulation of
the thermal control system will be developed and utilized for
testing of the KBS. The architecture and the hardware and
software platforms of the SSFP's Data Management System
(DMS) should be adhered to whenever possible. In addition,
since the contracting organization responsible for developing
the SSFP Thermal Control System is doing the TAAP work,
communication with the SSF team Is greatly increased (i.e.
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company - Space Station
Division is building the TAAP systems).
The TAAP project addresses these issues. A high-fidelity
simulation Is under development with particular attention
paid to the simulation of faults which are used for the testing
of the Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) KBS.'
The simulation is being developed with a code called the.
Advanced Thermal Hydraulic Energy Network Analyzer
(Athena) [ATHENA 86] which performs thermal-hydraulic
calculations required to simulate operation of the Active
Thermal Control System (ATCS). The plans are to run the
simulation in a batch/file mode with real-time (or near
real-time) capability added later.
TAAP uses a similar architecture and platform to the Space
Station's Data Management System. That is, an Intel 80386
based computer with Aria-based code is utilized when
More details on the TAAP approach are given in the ATCS
Advanced Automation section. The purpose of this
introduction was to provide an understanding of the origins
of the concept of automating the Space Station Thermal
Control System and an introduction to the TEXSYS and TAAP
approaches.
Space Station Freedom Thermal Control System
Overview
The Thermal Control System (TCS) for Space Station
Freedom (SSF) will provide the heating and cooling control
necessary to maintain elements, systems, and components
'within their required temperature ranges. The SSF TCS is
comprised of systems for passive and active thermal control.
Passive thermal control is performed through the use of
coatings, insulation, isolators, and selective placement of
heaters. Active thermal control includes both internal and
external systems. The internal thermal control system
collects and transports waste heat to the external system
from the habitation modules, resource nodes, and airlocks.
The external active thermal control system consists of a
thermal bus, its control hardware and software, and a set of
space radiators. The external system is the focus of the
TAAP, and is referred to here as the ATCS.
The ATCS is a central facility, transporting waste heat away
from crew quarters, experiment packages, computers, etc.,
and radiating it into space. It utilizes ammonia as the
working fluid and interfaces via heat acquisition devices
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(HADs) with the habitation and laboratory modules, and
pallet mounted equipment where the heal dissipation rates
are too high to be controlled passively. HADs are heat
exchangers that remove heat from fluid systems and
electronic equipment directly. Liquid ammonia is supplied to
the HADs by the ATCS and is vaporized by the particular heat
load being serviced. The vapor is transported to the
radiators which reject heat to space. Figure 2 shows a
configuration of the major ATCS components on SSF.
Key pumping and control elements are the Rotary Fluid
Management Device (RFMD) and the Back Pressure
Regulating Valve (BPRV). The RFMD is a special centrifugal
pumping device designed to separate liquid from vapor and.
operate in zero-gravity. Temperature control of the system
is accomplished by control of RFMD drum pressure. The
BPRV regulales saturation conditions in the main chamber of
the RFMD by regulating pressure over a range corresponding
to the desirable temperature set point of the system. Both of
these components exhibit highiy nonlinear nominal behavior"
which makes constructing dynamic numerical simulations
difficult.
These activities continue 24 hours a day during a mission.
Shuttle missions last only a few days, while the SSF Is
projected to be in orbit for 30 years. By automating some or
most of the FDIR functions the need for constant direct
human monitoring and intervention will be decreased.
it is difficult to overstate the complexity of monitoring and
diagnosing continuous variable dynamic systems in which
few system parameters are observable. A variation of the
General Diagnostic Engine (GDE), a model-based reasoning
algorithm, was applied to a prototype space station thermal
bus on the TEXSYS project. It was found that maintaining
multiple fault hypotheses" in currently available truth
maintenance systems made real-time (approx. 1 minute)
performance very difficult to achieve. Fault detection
capability is also dependent on sensor distribution and
variety. Less instrumentation increases the complexity of
obtaining data for FDIR and increases reliance on algorithms
to infer the state of a component from less direct sensor
information.
Baseline Approach
The FDIR Automation Problem
Performing Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery means
monitoring and identifying fault conditions through
interpretation of sensor inputs and calculated data. System
control is required for executing the approriate actions to
recover from the condition and return to a nominal operating
mode, if possible. In an automated ATCS system, monitoring.
and control (M&C) and FDIR functions will be integrated.
The system will be able to detect and diagnose the causes of,
faults, and then request confirmation or automatically_
invoke appropriate recovery or reconfiguration procedures.
The need for automation is clear. Complex space-based
systems require constant monitoring of health information.
Human operators scan telemetry for slight deviations from
expected norms. In real-time, continuous operations this Js
very expensive. For shuttle operations, many systems
require several engineers to monitor paramelers,
configuration, and component health changes for anomalies.
I
Cavitating
Venturi
This section describes the current issues facing the
automation of the SSFP ATCS. The SSF team has recently
undergone a Congressionally mandated restructuring effort.
This effort has changed the particulars of the SSFP ATCS
design including the design of the moniloring and control
software which is responsible for the FDIR. However, the
general choice of software techniques seems to remain the
same, so this technique is described. Additionally, the
constraints which led to this design concept are described and
the relative advantages and disadvantages of such an approach
are given.
This redesign affects software in a very large way. The
number of onboard processors is now reduced to two Intel
80386 machines for initial phases of the SSFP. The bottom
line for the monitor and control (M&C) software of the TCS
is that there will be approximately 80kBytes of memory for
the entire system. This poses a major constraint. It was
decided that the M&C software would be divided into two
parts, an onboard portion and a ground-based portion. The
T
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Figure 2 - SSF Thermal Component Overview.
62
onboard portion wou|d have the task of handling the safety-
critical faults, faults which must be isolated and/or
recovered from immediately due to the severity, of the fault's
consequences. The portion moved to the ground would handle
all other faults which are not as constrained by criticality or
response time.
The baseline approach, prior to the restructuring, has been
a table-driven design and it is likely this same technique
will continue as the initial design for the M&C software.
Basically, an event (e.g. sensor out of limits), triggered by
the DMS will trigger the FDIR. The FDIR software will
execute, using table data applicable to the event. This
technique places the fault signatures across the rows of the
table. An executive module matches the sensor data to one of
these rows which contain sensor data approximations of what
the fault corresponding to that row looks like (the fault
signature). Each column will correspond to a particular
sensor or other data item. When a match is made, that row's
fault is isolated and the pertinent recovery action is taken.
This sort of table driven or table lookup approach fits weii
with the constraints when limited to safety critical faults
only. It takes up small amounts of memory and storage, Is
relatively fast, and can isolate all enumerated faults. There
are some problems with this approach that need to be
examined.
One problem is that this can only diagnose faults written into
the system. Multiple faults are not typically enumerated and
if a sensor fails, the fault signatures change for all faults
using that particular sensor, or, if the sensor reads bad
information, it could diagnose a fault that isn't there. The
table-lookup mechanism cannot, by itself, handle a problem
not explicitly coded in the table.
It's important to have a mechanism for sensor failures to be
contained. Sensor noise could force a false positive of a
particular fault signature. Without a sensor check
mechanism, a false recovery action could be taken. If a
sensor fault is allowed to persist, which is quite likely due to
the lack of reliability of sensors, particularly
thermocouples, the ability to isolate even the enumerated
faults is greatly diminished, if not eliminated.
Another major concern is the problem of FDIR on systems
which have been reconfigured. Failed sensors and
components could take months to replace. The tables would
need to be coded for every newly reconfigured system state.
This can lead to a combinatorial explosion of tables. Each.
fault multiplied by each sensor, multiplied by each new
system state is quite a large number of tables. Considering
the difficulty of enumerating all the faults, or all the system
reconfigured states, this is quite a large problem.
However problematic the baseline approach is for handling
FDIR on the SSF ATCS, it is well thought out considering the
computational restraints onboard. With regards to onboard
design and emergency fault handling capability, there may
initially be no other choice. The major issue is that a
predominant amount of faults will be handled in ground-
based systems. This ground based portion of the system must
avoid most of the problems with table lookup enumerated
above. The automation of FDIR requires the use of the most
advanced programming techniques available.
ATCS Advanced Automation
Advanced automation includes techniques and applications for
monitoring, control, and FDIR. Some of the criteria used for
determining the degree of automation are:
saTety,
• lowered operations life cycle costs,
• development cost,
• efficiency (ground controller and crew productivity),
• reliability,
• technology maturity,
• integration with existing controls,
• operational support requirements,
• human factors concerns (response time, task
monotony),
• impact to established schedules and baselines,
• chances of operational acceptance.
Another factor effecting the thermal system automation scope
was the removal of all but safety critical FDIR from on-
board.
The TAAP has two primary activities: development of a
monitoring and diagnosis system for the ATCS and
development of a faultable high-fidelity simulation (HFS) of
the ATCS. While the HFS is not the main subject of this
paper, it is crucial to the overall success of the KBS
development. The high-fidelity simulator will have
interactive capabilities and provide dynamic bus
performance to simulate known ATCS fault modes.
Development and testing of FDIR software requires faulting
the hardware in various ways while observing and tuning the
detection and isolation process. This type of hardware
testing is extremely expensive. Faults which might damage
the ATCS must obviously be avoided, yet a method is needed
for testing all conceivable faults. The HFS will allow
inexpensive testing of virtually any fault without risk to
hardware.
The TAAP KBS is a hybrid design approach using a
combination of conventional programming, tables, rule-
based technology and model-based reasoning to provide
powerful and flexible diagnositic expertise for the ATCS.
TAAP will initially act as an extension to the SSF baseline
FDIR capabilities, and could be migrated on-board in stages
as additional computational resources are made available.
The top level fault isolation process used by the TAAP KBS is:
1 ) The KBS determines that a sensor has passed one of its
alarm limits;
2 ) A table-based check is performed to quickly catch a
small number of potentially catastrophic failures;
3) The KBS uses local propagation and consistency
checking in a model to determine whether the sensor
reading is valid or the result of faulty instrumentation;
4 ) If the alarm is valid, the KBS uses a rule-based system
to isolate faults defined in the Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) [FDIR 88];
5) If the rule system is unable to isolate the fault
conclusively, then control is returned to a model-based
reasoning (MBR) algorithm for further diagnosis.
Part of the system is Implemented using CLIPS v5, which
includes an object system called COOL (CLIPS Object
Oriented Language). CLIPS is primarily a rule-based
forward-chaining inferencing tool. The TAAP rule-based
system consists of forward-chaining rules driven by ATCS
sensor data and calculated values. The COOL environment is
different in some ways from a pure object oriented
programming (OOP) language, however it does have the
primary characteristics thai an OOP system must possess:
abstraction, encapsulation, inheritance, polymorphism and
dynamic binding. This allows us to implement a "functional
simulation" of the ATCS by defining objects and relationships
in the COOL environment.
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Procedural and numeric-intensive portions of the KBS are
currently implemented in structured C code. This includes
interface functions needed to handle input and output of
parameters to external functions, as well as some
calculations involved in model propagation.
Figure 3 shows a functional view of the TAAP KBS
architecture. Real-time sensor
data from the HFS or actual hardware is accepted into the
KBS by Data Queue code which stores time-slices of data and
performs several checks. It checks flags for each sensor to
see which values have been updated, then it creates a Suspect
Sensor List (SSL). The SSL contains information about
which sensor values have exceeded KBS alarm limits. The
Data Monitor module is primarily responsible for standard
calculations performed at the end of each time-slice. These
include: recalculating/updating pseudo values, updating
short- and long-term trends, checking/updating historical
deltas, maintaining current-value-duration information,
and determining qualitative mappings. The Data Queue and
Data Monitor together contain a representation of the
current system configuration at any time (i.e. valve states,
switches, power, etc.).
The KBS Controller is the primary switching center for the
KBS. First, it inspects the SSL to determine if sensor
validation is required. If necessary, it then supplies the
model with sensor readings corresponding to model slots and
invokes sensor validation. It also builds facts and asserts
them into the Rule-Based System (RBS) facts list. When the
RBS or model-based sensor validation is complete, the KBS
Controller interprets their diagnoses. If the
instrumentation is deemed valid and the RBS cannot match
against a known fault, then the Controller initiates model-
based reasoning again, this time for the purpose of
component fault diagnosis.
Sensor validation is performed when there is exactly one
suspect sensor. When more than one sensor is referenced by
the SSL, sensor validation is not performed. The assumption
is that if only one sensor is out of its application limits, then
it is more reasonable to suspect that the sensor has failed
than to suspect that an ATCS component failure is causing a
single perturbation. After the model has been instantiated
with current sensor values, pre-compiled hierarchical
information (generated directly from the model) is used to
determine the scope of propagation required. The model is
then propagated to bind state variables not connected to
sensor instrumentation and to compute an expected value for
the suspect sensor. The observed readings at each point are
then compared with the corresponding computed values in
the model. If these two values are within tolerance for all
non-suspect sensors, then the suspect sensor is diagnosed as
Invalid. If one or more non-suspect sensors are out of
tolerance (reading vs. computed value), then no
determination can be made regarding the validity of the
suspect sensor. More specifically, we now have reason to
believe that our Initial assumption of nominal operation was
incorrect.
Note that the model is propagated with the assumption that
the bus is operating nominally. In fact both nominal and off-
nominal operating conditions cover continuous ranges. For
example, if one evaporator has been shut dowfi, the
reconfigured bus can still be viewed as operating nominally.
Conversely, there Is no discrete distinction between off-
nominal behaviors. An infinite number of scenarios are
possible.
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Figure 3 - TAAP KBS Functional Architecture.
The RBS uses forward chaining rules, matching on patterns
of system status information. The design intention of the
RBS was to represent the thermal expertise at the highest
possible level in the rules. Underlying functionality
required for this purpose is generally implemented in the
faster procedural language - C. The following is an example
of the left-hand side of a rule showing the use of high level
thermal knowledge.
(defrule ...
(st-trend TOTAL_HEAT_LOAD steady)
(qpseudo SUBCOOLING very_low)
(qsensor BPS702 nominal)
(test
(> (extrap BPS702 20.0 STT) 300))
....
Referencing qualitative states (e.g• steady, very_low,
nominal) rather than numbers in rule premises makes the
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RBS much more robust. Transition points are defined and
can be modified such thal a quantitative value range
corresponding to a qualitative translation of "low" may be
different depending on the current syslem mode. This allows
the rules to represent thermal knowledge the way it is,
expressed by the thermal engineer. A straight-forward
statement such as *determine if the heat load Is steady _
represents a slgaificant amount of knowledge, non-trivial
calculation and data tracking. The fundamentally numeric-
intensive portions are handled procedurally while only the.
diagnostic knowledge Is placed into the rules. Another
benefit of qualitative techniques is that pre-compiled
relationships (extracted directly from the model) can be
used to replace primary sensor values with secondary
choices. On-orbit a failed sensor may not be replaceable for
several months. Working with the instrumentation available
is imperative.
Model-based reasoning for component diagnosis is the most
complex and "cutting-edge" portion of the KBS. While the
model-based sensor validation phase could assume nominal
operation, model-based component diagnosis is much more
difficult. The MBR component fault diagnosis makes heavy
use of thermal specific knowledge for hypothesis generation
and validation.
In performing component diagnosis the entire model is
propagated. This will prevent missing systemic faults,
where failures in one parl of the bus quickly impact a
structurally distant portion. The assumption is made that
the bus is operating normally, and that all of our sensor
instrumentation is valid. Propagating the model and
comparing sensor readings to computed values allows us to
build a fault-symptom list. The fault-symptom list
represents inconsistencies between observed and computed
values.
The fault-symptom list is then "mapped" onto a causal
relationship model of the ATCS. The causal description of the
system is used to generate hypotheses of component failures
which could be causing each of the symptoms. For each
inconsistency represented in the fault-symptom ilst the
causal model will determine single-component failures
which could explain thal specific inconsistency. The
intersection of the component-failure hypotheses sets
returns only those which could be responsrole for all the
symptoms. A future capability to diagnose multiple
simultaneous independent failures would be added by
expanding the scope/knowledge represented in the causal
model. Due to reliability requirements, diagnosing
simultaneous independent failures is not considered a
,primary goal of this project.
The hypotheses generation phase will result in hypotheses
which could account for all the observed symptoms. The
validation phase will determine which of these can also
account for the remaining observations. Each failure
hypothesis is simulated in the faultable, quantitative model.
For example, if we hypothesize that a blockage just
downstream of the BPRV could cause all the inconsistencies,
then we reconfigure the model to reflect a valve at that
location being closed and run a simulation. If one of the
simulations results in state values comparable to current
observations from the sensors, then that hypothesis has been
validated (i.e., any surviving hypothesis represents a fault).
If none of the hypotheses are supported by simulation, then
further discrimination between them may not be possible.
Prompting the human operator for more information might
allow us to discriminate further between hypotheses.
However, automatically determining the appropriate
questions depending on the situtation is a difficult task not
currently within the scope of this project.
The multi-stage FDIR process just described makes
significant additions to the baseline approach. The design
attempts to use the best pads of several methodologies while
avoiding their restrictions.
The functional use of a Data Queue and Monitor for
representation of the current system configuration has
advantages over both the baseline and traditional model-
based approaches. It provides the structure and data access
necessary for complex procedural control processes to be
kept updated while avoiding the overhead of conventional OOP
systems. Since data control, monitoring and distribution are
core requirements of every KBS function, the optimization of
these activities is crucial to obtaining desireable
performance.
In an early stage, the TAAP KBS uses a minimal table lookup
for detecting safety-critical faults, similar to the baseline
approach. The TAAP approach allows even the safety critical
routine to utilize secondary sensor-source information
generated from the model. Just as in the RBS, this makes the
table lookup more robust.
The use of a KBS Controller as a centralized switching
mechanism for reasoning accomodates a hybrid, multiple
technique approach, and effectively modularizes the entire
reasoning portion of the system. The relative maturity of
rule-based reasoning means the RBS would be more likely to
migrate on-board earlier than the MBR capabilities. The
decoupling of diagnostic approaches has an advantage of
allowing initial ground-based support versions to easily run
on seperate, networked workstations if necessary. This
improves the prospects of achieving satisfactory response
times.
By assuming that multiple simultaneous sensors failures are
extremely unlikely, the need for an ongoing sensor validation
routine is avoided. When sensor validation is needed, a
single propagation and straight-forward consistency check
are sufficient.
As mentioned above, some variation of the RBS will I_ely be
the first ATCS advanced automation to migrate on-board.
Advantages of the rule-based system over the baseline table-
driven approach are numerous. The rules represent
diagnostic knowledge at a high level, allowing easier human
interpretation, maintenance and meaningful explanation
capabilities. The RBS is not tied to a specific configuration.
Its data-driven nature combined with support code for
primary and alternate instrumentation allows it to degrade
more gracefully than a table lookup.
Many previous automation efforts have been heavily driven
by schedule, resulting in technical design decisions that
range from carefully considered to poorly designed. The fact
that "deep reasoning" models can be built from design
activities rather early in a program allows us to have begun
Implementation of this KBS long before first element launch,
or even completion of the thermal testbed work. The TAAP
model-based reasoning for component diagnosis will require
several test and modification cycles before the system is
fully functional. Before first element aunch the thermal
system hardware will go through at least three more major
milestones representing potential design changes. All of this
serves to further point out the advantages of a model-based
approach.
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The device oriented representation used for MBR is the
cognitive link between software and hardware. By keeping
development responsibility for the KBS within the thermal
systems group, device models for reasoning can be updated in
a timely and accurate manner as new design information
becomes available. It is clearly advantageous to have the KBS
developers located with the ATCS system engineers.
Conclusion
The table lookup approach described fits well with current
onboard constraints of memory and processing power.
Although the tables will be difficult to maintain and expand,
the inclusion of only safety-critical faults may keep them
small enough to avoid any significant problems. Failure of
onboard sensor instrumentation can cause problems for the
table driven FDIR. Temporary changes in system
configuration, such as isolating and shutting down a single
evaporator, may require table changes. Finally, the
continuous nature of the ATCS when operating nominally may
expose the biggest drawback of the table lookup approach.
A hybrid KBS approach to advanced automation will provide
both lower lifecycle costs and increased capability. The
high-level knowledge representation used in the KBS allows
changes to be made easily and new maintenance and support
personnel to come up to speed quickly. The KBS will be more
robust in reasoning over a degraded or reconfigured system
than a table driven approach. The diagnosis of off-nominal
behavior, not just known faults, will be possible with the
hybrid approach described. The KBS will initially act as a
ground-based extension to the core capabilities provided by
the onboard table lookup.
The combination of stable, mature technologies with state-
of-the-art MBR approaches is advantageous for several
reasons. It allows portions of the KBS to be ported on-board
as they are completed, confidence is developed, and computer
resources become available. It is advantageous to the FDIR
development effort to use existing resources and technology.
The forward chaining rules used In the RBS, for example,
are considered very mature technology. Each of the
approaches require successively more speed and RAM for
actual implementation.
Given significant mistrust of artificial intelligence
techniques by the thermal engineers, user confidence in a
system such as the TAAP KBS must be earned gradually. A
system offering only a small improvement over baseline
monitoring and control capabilities would have difficulty
gaining acceptance. The TAAP approach will allow an
evolution of functionality and in so doine, will enable
engineers to become more confident is this technology. New'
!echnologies are being developed all the time and the TAAP
approach will allow integration of such technologies as they
become available (e.g. predictive maintenance, faster MBR
systems, etc.).
The cost of automation endeavors has often been excessive and
in some cases prohibitive. Viewed more closely, however, a
KBS approach to automation Is cost effective. The
development of the TAAP KBS for FDIR also supports a
console operator in real-time and has components in its
implementation (both knowledge bases and inferencing
techniques) useful in predictive maintenance systems,
training, and autonomous operations. If the common
underlying system knowledge can be used in deploying each
application then additional knowledge acquisition costs are
saved. If these factors are used to effectively prorate project
costs, the apparent high price of automation is reduced.
The cost of advanced automation can also be compared 1o the
cost of extensive human training for monitoring of space
systems. The full integrated mission simulations used for
training shuttle support personnel cost thousands of dollars
per day. These training costs alone demand that any task
which can be effectively automated, should be automated.
In a major multi-year, multi-national development effort
such as the SSFP, many design changes for various reasons
will be made, impacting all aspects of the project. These
design changes also have serious impact on development of
FDIR capabilities for effected systems. A dynamically
changing hardware environment favors the use of a hybrid
approach with a device oriented model-based representation
over the baseline techniques described.
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